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NEW FEDERALISM AND "OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD":
FAILING TO MAINTAIN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS WITHIN A PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK-Alverado v. Washington PublicPower Supply System, 111 Wash. 2d 424, 759
P.2d 427 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
Abstract: In Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System, the Washington
Supreme Court held that nonbinding agency action preempted Washington's constitutional right to privacy in the context of employee drug testing at nuclear power plants.
This preemption holding was based on traditional "occupation of the field" standards,
which prohibit concurrent state regulation in areas where the federal government exercises
plenary power. Because it was based on an "occupation of the field" finding, the court's
decision had the practical effect of permitting nonenforceable agency pronouncements to
preempt state constitutional guarantees. An exception to traditional "occupation of the
field" doctrine is proposed to rectify this summary preemption of state civil rights. The
exception would require that courts uphold state constitutional guarantees when the specific federal interest in an occupied field is only expressed by nonbinding agency
pronouncements.

In Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 1 the Washington Supreme Court held that state constitutional guarantees of privacy do not apply to employee drug testing programs at nuclear power
plants. 2 The plaintiffs in Alverado, prospective employees at a nuclear
plant, challenged the plant's preemployment drug tests as violating
article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution,3 which grants a
specific right to privacy.4 The court held that because Congress has
occupied the field of nuclear safety, federal law preempted application
of the state constitution to determine the validity of the challenged
drug testing program.'
In reaching its preemption decision, the Alverado court failed to
consider two factors. First, the lawsuit did not involve a federal regulation at all; the plaintiffs merely challenged the nuclear plant's interpretation of nonbinding agency action. 6 Second, the court failed to
consider whether, in light of the state constitutional renaissance or
"new federalism," 7 federal occupation of a field should preempt state
1. 111 Wash. 2d 424, 759 P.2d 427 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1637 (1989).
2. Id. at 429, 759 P.2d at 430.
3. Id. at 425, 759 P.2d at 428.
4. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
5. Alverado, 111 Wash. 2d at 429, 759 P.2d at 430.
6. See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text (discussing legal and practical effect of
proposed agency rules and policy statements).
7. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing the emerging importance of state
constitutions in American jurisprudence).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 64:721, 1989

constitutional guarantees. Instead, the court held sua sponte that
under the traditional "occupation of the field" doctrine, 8 the agency's
nonbinding actions preempted the state constitution.9 This result
ignores the emerging importance of state constitutional law, especially
in light of the expanding reach of federal agencies and the shrinking
scope of federal civil rights.'" An exception to traditional "occupation
of the field" analysis is necessary to preserve state protections in our
growing administrative state." Such an exception would require that
courts defer to state constitutional guarantees when the specific federal
interest in an occupied field is not expressed by binding agency rules.
I.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND NUCLEAR POWER
REGULATION

A.

Preemption Generally

Traditional federal preemption doctrine holds that federal law
preempts state law under two circumstances.' 2 First, Congress may
explicitly or implicitly "occupy the field."' 3 In this situation, no parallel state regulation is permitted regardless of conflict or harmony
with federal law.' 4 Second, when federal law has not occupied the
field, state law will still be preempted if it actually conflicts with federal law or frustrates a congressional purpose.' 5 Because federal
8. Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., Il1 Wash. 2d 424, 429-31, 759 P.2d
427, 430-31 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
9. Id. at 429, 759 P.2d at 430.
10. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing the expanding administrative
state).
11. For purposes of this Note, "administrative state" refers to congressionally created
agencies that establish and enforce national public policy. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S.
470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
12. Federal preemption of state law is based on the supremacy clause of the federal
Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. Vi, cl.2.
13. The United States Supreme Court recently summarized the test for preemption in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). The Court found that state law can
be preempted in one of two ways. First, if Congress intends to occupy a field, any state law
falling within that field is preempted. Second, if Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation over a matter, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law. State law conflicts with federal law when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law, or where the state law inhibits accomplishing the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. Id.
14.

Id.; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479 (2d ed. 1988).

15. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248; see also I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE 623 (1986) [hereinafter 1 R. ROTUNDA]:
L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 479.

New Federalism and Preemption
agency regulations qualify as federal law,16 those regulations can preempt conflicting state laws. 17
Both kinds of preemption, "occuption of the field" and actual conflict with federal law or frustration of congressional purposes, appear
throughout federally regulated areas.18 These general verbal formulae,
however, do not provide perfectly articulable standards.1 9 Diverse
regulatory areas and schemes preclude such simple analysis."0 Pre21
emption analysis is essentially a matter of statutory construction.
Courts determine congressional intent, 22 then base preemption decisions on the specifics of the relationship between the federal and state
statutory provisions. 23 Because each regulated area presents unique
problems of congressional intent and statutory construction, preemption rationales in one area do not translate easily to another. 24 In
nuclear power regulation the preemption rationale typically involves
occupation of the field rather than conflict analysis.
B.

Development of Preemption Rationales in Nuclear Power
Regulation: The Federally-OccupiedField of Nuclear Safety

Development of preemption rationales in nuclear power regulation
begins with the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("AEA"). 26 The
AEA authorized private entities to enter the nuclear power industry
16. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (agency regulations
promulgated within the scope of congressionally delegated authority have the force of law).
17. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(both federal regulations and federal statutes can preempt state law).
18. See 1 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 624 & n.9.
19. The verbal standards do not provide "an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive
constitutional yardstick." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). General development of
these preemption standards is found in the following line of cases: Id.; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
20. 1 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 629.
21. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 480-81.
22. Determining congressional intent to preempt is problematic because many state laws exist
before Congress attempts to regulate a new area. 1 R. ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 624.
Furthermore, Congress rarely makes a specific statement regarding preemption of an entire
field. Id. Finally, Congress usually provides a savings clause that preserves parallel state
legislation. Id.
23. Id. at 629.
24. Id. at 624.
25. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 212 (1983) (with few exceptions, Congress has occupied the field of nuclear safety). For
a more in-depth discussion of the history of preemption and nuclear power regulation, see
Comment, Emergency Offsite Planningfor Nuclear Power Plants: FederalVersus State and Local
Control, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 417 (1988).
26. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1982)) [hereinafter "AEA"].
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for the first time.27 In addition, states were allowed to regulate the
generation, sale, and transmission of electric power. 28 The federal
Atomic Energy Commission, which eventually was replaced by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), 29 supervised all other facets of nuclear energy development. 3"
Since 1959, the states have been granted a limited role in nuclear
safety regulation. First, Congress expressly authorized the states to
regulate radioactive effluence and low level waste.3 1 Second, despite
blanket statements to the contrary,3 2 the Supreme Court has allowed
the states to regulate some safety matters by characterizing the state
interest as an economic one.3 3
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Development Commission,34 the United States Supreme Court established a dual regulatory system whereby the states regulate the economic aspects of nuclear power and the federal government occupies
the field of nuclear safety.3 5 In Pacific Gas, the Court held that a state
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1982). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 amended the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, which granted the federal government exclusive control, use, and ownership
of nuclear technology. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (repealed 1974).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1982).
29. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233. 1237 (1974)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This Act dismantled the Atomic Energy
Commission and split its functions between two new agencies. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission became the regulatory body, while the Energy Research and Development
Administration pursued promotional duties. Id.
30. States were not permitted to license the "transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition,
possession, [or] use of nuclear materials." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 207 (1983).
31. In 1959, Congress amended the AEA to give the states a limited role in controlling
radiological safety. By making agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission in the interest
of public health and safety, the states could regulate byproduct, source, and special nuclear
materials in limited quantities that could not attain a critical mass. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982).
Since amending the AEA in 1959, Congress has expressly authorized state regulation of
radiological safety in three other ways. First, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to permit
states to require more stringent radioactive effluence standards than federal law. See Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 122, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Second, Congress has allowed states to impose certain land use
and siting requirements. See NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. 96-295, 94
Stat. 780. Third, Congress enacted the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d), requiring states to dispose of wastes created within their boundaries. 42
U.S.C. § 2021(d)(l) (1982).
32. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212 (the federal government has occupied the entire field of
nuclear safety matters).
33. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings in Pacific Gas and
Silkwood).
34. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
35. Id. at 212. For in-depth analysis of the holding in Pacific Gas, see Note, Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission: Broadening
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could stop nuclear power development for economic reasons, even
though that action could be motivated by safety concerns.3 6 While
this decision apparently intrudes on the occupied field of 3nuclear
7
safety, subsequent cases indicate that it is a limited intrusion.
According to the Court, states have no authority to regulate radiological safety except for those powers expressly granted by Congress.3 8
State authority, therefore, is limited to economic regulation.3 9 This
general proposition is true even after the Court's decision in Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 0 In Silkwood, the Court held that Congress did
not intend to preempt state punitive damage awards against nuclear
power plants. 41 The Court made this decision in spite of the fact that
punitive damages regulate safety.42
Although some believed that the Court's decisions in Pacific Gas
and Silkwood would lead to broad state regulation of nuclear power,4 3
lower courts subsequently held that both decisions only establish narrow exceptions to the occupied field of nuclear safety. In two cases
addressing local attempts to regulate nuclear energy, federal courts of
the Scope ofState Authority To Control the Development of NuclearEnergy, 33 DE PAUL L. REV.
371 (1984); Note, Pacific Gas & Electric: A Nuclear Energy Option or a Nuclear Energy
Mandate?, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1984).
36. California passed a moratorium which prohibited construction of new nuclear power
plants until the federal government approved technology that could safely dispose of radioactive
waste. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 190. The California legislature carefully drafted the moratorium,
claiming that the potential costs of nuclear energy-especially disposal costs-were so uncertain
that fiscal responsibility required the state to reject new power plants. Id. The Court accepted
California's proffered explanation without further questioning whether the legislature acted for
safety rather than economic reasons. See id. at 213-14.
37. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the safety field has
been broadly construed to preempt local attempts to regulate nuclear power).
38. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212.
39. Id.
40. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
41. Id. at 258. In Silkwood, the estate of a nuclear plant's employee sued the plant under
state law for plutonium contamination suffered by the employee. The estate was allowed to
recover both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 245. The plant appealed, claiming that
because the federal government has occupied the field of nuclear safety, punitive damage awards
and their safety-inducing purpose were precluded. Id. at 249. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the
plant and reversed the punitive damage award. Id. at 246. Reversing the Tenth Circuit, a
divided Supreme Court found that the AEA did not preempt state punitive damage awards. Id.
at 251.
42. See Chiapetta, United States Energy Policy After Pacific Gas and Silkwood, 1985 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 79, 92 (1985).
43. Several commentators have stated that the Pacific Gas and Silkwood decisions leave the
federal-state allocation of authority in considerable confusion. See, e.g., Chiapetta, supranote 42,
at 108; Huber, Electricityand the Environment: In Search of RegulatoryAuthority, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 1002, 1032 (1987). Such criticism is beyond the scope of this Note, which is limited to
illustrating the Supreme Court's decision that, with minor exceptions, the federal government
has occupied the field of nuclear safety.
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appeal have broadly construed the occupied field of nuclear safety and
held that the local laws were preempted. 44 Thus, the general rule
remains that the federal government exercises plenary power over
nuclear safety matters while the states are limited to economic
concerns.
C.

Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System

On August 5, 1982, the NRC published a proposed rule which
would have required prospective licensees to ensure that personnel
with unescorted access to protected areas were free from the influence
of drugs and alcohol.4 5 The NRC deferred implementing this rule,
however, and agreed to accept programs initiated by the nuclear
power industry instead.46
Washington Nuclear Plant 2 ("WNP 2"), operated by the defendant
Washington Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS"), responded to
the NRC's actions by instituting a drug screening program in June,
1986. 4" The program affected both WPPSS employees and contractor
employees. Specifically, the program required urinalysis as part of the
preemployment medical evaluation for new employees.4 8 Current
employees could only be tested "for cause."'4 9
On August 4, 1986, the NRC withdrew the proposed rule requiring
drug tests and instead published a "Statement on Fitness for Duty of
Nuclear Power Plant Personnel." 5 ° This policy statement contained
44. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir. 1985)
(township's ordinance preventing power company from shipping radioactive waste to a site in the
township preempted because township's purpose was to protect public safety), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1013 (1986); see also County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 60 (2d
Cir. 1984) (county's suit against power company alleging company mismanagement and fraud
rejected because county's claims regarding design defects constituted indirect efforts to regulate
radiological safety).
45. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,980 (1982). The proposed rule made no specific demands. Instead, the
rule merely stated that licensees should establish and implement "adequate written procedures"
to ensure that personnel with unescorted access to protected areas were free of the influence of
drugs or alcohol. Id. Earlier, in February 1982, the NRC published six safety goals, but these
goals did not address personnel fitness for duty. Rather, the goals augmented the general
proposition that societal risks from nuclear accidents should be comparable to the risks of
generating electricity by viable competing technologies. See NRC OFFICE OF POLICY
EVALUATION, SAFETY GOALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A DISCUSSION PAPER

(NUREG-0880, Feb. 1982), quoted in Huber, supra note 43, at 1017 nn.55-57.
46. Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., Ill Wash. 2d 424, 427, 759 P.2d 427,
429 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1637 (1989).
47. Id. at 427, 759 P.2d at 429.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,921 (1986).
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several "expectations" for maintaining a drug-free environment.5 1
One of the expectations stated that licensees should implement
"[e]ffective monitoring and testing procedures" to ensure that employees were fit for duty.52
The plaintiffs in Alverado were prospective employees for WNP 2
and WPPSS contractors. On December 3, 1986, the plaintiffs filed a
motion to enjoin WPPSS and a WPPSS contractor, Bechtel Construction, from requiring preemployment drug tests. 3 The state trial court,
54
holding that state law did not prohibit the tests, denied the motion.
The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review. On review,
the plaintiffs claimed that the preemployment drug tests violated their
rights to privacy under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution. 5 Both plaintiffs and defendants restricted their briefs to this
issue. 56 The court held sua sponte that the drug testing program fell
under the occupied field of nuclear safety.5 7 Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiffs were barred from pressing a state claim.5 8 After
denying the state claim, the court found that the WPPSS preemployment drug tests satisfied the administrative search exception to the
fourth amendment. 9
51. Id. at 27,922; see infra note 92 (containing full text of NRC policy statement).
52. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,922 (1986). An employee free from the influence of drugs and alcohol is
considered "fit for duty." Id. at 27,921.
53. While the antidrug program required both "for cause" testing of current employees and
preemployment tests, Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash. 2d 424, 427,
759 P.2d 427, 429 (1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989), the plaintiffs only challenged the
preemployment tests. Id. at 429, 759 P.2d at 430.
54. Id. at 430, 759 P.2d at 430.
55. Id. at 429, 759 P.2d at 430. The Washington constitution grants a specific right to
privacy. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing development of Washington's
constitutional right to privacy).
56. Alverado, 111 Wash. 2d at 429-30, 759 P.2d at 430.
57. The court found that safety concerns in nuclear power plants present a "classic example
of congressional intent to 'occupy the field' and preempt any state action." Id. at 432, 759 P.2d
at 431. The court then found that drug testing was instituted to promote safety, and therefore
fell within the federally occupied field. Id. at 433, 759 P.2d at 431.
58. Id. at 429, 759 P.2d at 430.
59. Id. at 441, 759 P.2d at 436. The fourth amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Because drug testing is a warrantless search, it must satisfy an
exception to the fourth amendment's general requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to
a valid warrant based on probable cause that a violation of law has occurred. See Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Warrantless administrative searches are constitutionally
reasonable if the regulated body is a pervasively regulated industry. United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms and munitions dealers). The rationale for this exception is that because
routine inspections are necessary to enforce government regulations, such inspections do not
require probable cause. Alverado, 111 Wash. 2d at 435, 759 P.2d at 433.
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NEW FEDERALISM: THE EMERGING ROLE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

"New federalism," a label attached to the actions of many state
courts that have recently "rediscovered" their state constitutions in
adjudicating civil rights claims, 6° may affect traditional preemption
analysis. Scholars agree that much of this rediscovery owes its impetus to the Supreme Court's curtailment of civil rights developed by the
Warren Court. 6 1 The state courts, in an effort to maintain civil rights,
have looked to federal constitutional law as establishing minimum
standards only. 62 Since 1970, state courts have published over 450
opinions holding that their state constitutions provide greater individual protections than does the federal Constitution.6 3 These opinions
have focused on state bills of rights and the so-called fundamental
rights described therein.64
The state constitutional renaissance or "new federalism '6 5 provides
several advantages for American jurisprudence. First, the states are
able to develop civil rights frameworks reflecting the particularities of
their locales.6 6 Second, because the Supreme Court cannot review
60. Numerous articles comment favorably on this phenomenon. See, e.g., Brennan, The Bill
of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Civil Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions:Some Random Thoughts,
in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (B. McGraw ed. 1985). Some
commentators, however, have criticized this new reliance on state constitutions as illegitimate.
These commentators assert that states should follow the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Hudnut, State ConstitutionsandIndividualRights: The Casefor JudicialRestraint, 63 DEN.
U.L. REV. 85 (1985); Maltz, The Dark Side of State CourtActivism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985).
61. See Utter, State ConstitutionalLaw, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There A Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 29 (1989); Wilkes,
The New Federalism in CriminalProcedurein 1984: Death of the Phoenix?, in DEVELOPMENTS
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166, 167 (B. McGraw ed. 1985).
62. See Collins, supra note 60, at 2; Wilkes, supra note 61, at 167.
63. Galie, State Supreme Courts, Judicial Federalism, and the Other Constitutions, 71
JUDICATURE 100, 100-01 (1987).
64. Professor Collins notes that cases have covered the spectrum of fundamental rights
including free speech, equal protection, economic due process, criminal procedure, and the right
to bear arms. Collins, supra note 60, at 2.
65. Utter, supra note 61, at 29; Wilkes, supra note 61, at 167 (the term "new federalism" has
become accepted among scholars).
66. Justice Robert Utter of the Washington Supreme Court recently stated that state courts
should not assume their constitutions simply restate the United States Bill of Rights. Rather,
state courts should recognize that, due to historical and socio-economic differences, the state
framers likely did not have the same intent as the federal framers. Justice Utter notes that the
Washington framers, who adopted the state constitution more than one hundred years after the
federal Constitution, illustrate the point that independent state analysis is legitimate and
historically mandated. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a FederalSystem: Perspectives olIState
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239, 244 (B. McGraw ed. 1985).
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state-law decisions unless those decisions contravene federal law, 67
reliance on state constitutions assures greater finality for state court
judgments.6 8 Third, by determining state-law questions before federal
69
ones, state courts can avoid creating new federal law unnecessarily.
In other words, if a state statute or constitutional provision answers a
question dispositively, there is no need to address the federal question.
Thus, new federalism allows states to reassert the priority of state
law.

70

The Washington Supreme Court has adopted new federalism in the
area of privacy rights and searches.7" Article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution contains specific language granting a right to privacy. 72 The Washington court has long described this right as
providing greater protection to the individual than federal rights.73
For example, the court has used article I, section 7 to create a warrant
preference rule that only allows warrantless searches when their neces-

67. Collins, supra note 60, at 9.
68. This is the doctrine of "independent and adequate state grounds," a jurisdictional
doctrine which states that when a state court's judgment rests on two grounds, one federal and
one state, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction if the state ground is independent of the federal
ground and is adequate to support the judgment. See Greenhalgh, Independent and Adequate
State Grounds.: The Long and the Short of it, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 211, 211-12 (B. McGraw ed. 1985). The Supreme Court recently modified this doctrine in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (Supreme Court will presume jurisdiction if independent
and adequate state grounds are not clearly stated and it appears that the state court has relied on
federal doctrines).
69. If a state court sustains a claim under federal law, it will be forced to write two opinionsone federal and one state-if it hopes to develop state constitutional law. Collins, supra note 60,
at 8. By addressing state claims first, the burden of writing two opinions is lifted. Id.
Furthermore, those state courts deciding state claims first will not have to rehear cases as they
would if the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a federal question. Id.
70. Id. at 3.
71. Nock, Seizing Opportunity, SearchingForTheory: Article I Section 7, 8 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 331, 331 (1985).
72. See supra note 4.
73. Since State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978), Washington courts have
repeatedly held that in the criminal context, article I, section 7 provides greater individual
protections than the fourth amendment's search-and-seizure language. Nock, supra note 71, at
333. In the civil context, however, the courts have not relied on article I, section 7; rather, they
have limited their inquiry to fourth amendment doctrines. See, e.g., Kuehn v. Renton School
Dist. Number 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (inspection of student's baggage
without reasonable belief that violation occurred was unconstitutional under fourth amendment;
article I, section 7 violation asserted by plaintiff but not analyzed by court); King County v.
Primeau, 98 Wash. 2d 321, 654 P.2d 1199 (1982) (building inspector's failure to request
permission to enter home made subsequent search unconstitutional; article I, section 7 issues
raised only in Justice Utter's partial concurrence).
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sity is clearly demonstrated under the facts of each case. 74 The plaintiffs in Alverado relied on this commitment to individual privacy-a
75
commitment induced by new federalism-when they brought suit.
Section IV of this Note examines the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.
III.

PROPOSED RULES AND POLICY STATEMENTS:
NONBINDING AGENCY ACTION IN ALVERADO

The Washington Supreme Court in Alverado neglected two factors
that could have allowed it to apply state law to protect the plaintiffs'
privacy rights. First, the court did not analyze the legal effect of the
NRC's policy statement. Because policy statements are nonbinding
and do not constitute federal law, the statement could not have preempted the state constitution under conflict-type analysis. Second, the
policy statement contained such vague expectations that licensees had
discretion to choose the drug programs they deemed appropriate.
Thus, the court's strict application of occupation of the field analysis
permitted a licensee's interpretation of nonbinding agency action to
preempt state constitutional guarantees.
A.

The Plaintiffs Challenged WPPSS' Interpretationof Nonbinding
Agency Action

In concluding that drug tests fall within the exclusive purview of the
federal government,76 the Alverado court failed to evaluate the legal
effect of the NRC's proposed rule, the decision to accept industryinitiated programs in lieu of the proposed rule, and the legal effect of
the 1986 policy statement. Because the NRC formally withdrew the
proposed rule, the only published standards for antidrug programs
available to the Alverado court were those in the 1986 policy statement. Thus, in spite of the fact that the policy statement was issued
two months after WPPSS instituted its antidrug program, analysis of
that statement is appropriate to evaluate the impact of the court's
decision.
Policy statements are nonlegislative rules that indicate agency goals
and outline how the agency may exercise discretionary powers in the
74. See Nock, supra note 71, at 339. This is Professor Nock's assessment of State v.
Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984), and State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686. 674
P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled by State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
75. Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 11l
Wash. 2d 424, 759 P.2d 427 (1988) (No. 53616-3).
76. Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash. 2d 424, 430, 759 P.2d 427.
430 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
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future." Modem agencies commonly publish policy statements in lieu
of legislative rules,78 otherwise known as formal rules or regulations.7 9
While policy statements must be published in the Federal Register,8"
such statements are not legally enforceable;8 1 they do not bind the
public, as do legislative rules.8 2 This nonbinding character attaches to
general policy statements because they do not require the public notice
and comment necessary to legislative rules.8 3 Because policy state-

ments are not legislative rules they do not qualify as federal law, and
therefore do not preempt state law.
While the theoretical legal effect of legislative rules and policy state84
ments is clear, distinguishing one from the other has proved difficult.
This difficulty results from the practical effects of both actions." Gen-

erally, licensees follow policy statements as if they were valid administrative rules.86 Therefore, actual public reaction to legislative rules and
policy statements is often identical.8 7
In distinguishing policy statements from legislative rules, courts traditionally look to several factors.8 8 First, the agency's label for an

action usually carries great weight, although that label is not dispositive.89 Additionally, agency guidelines will be characterized as policy
statements if the guidelines fail to establish mandatory standards, the
orders use tentative language and appear temporary in duration, the
77. Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 386
(1985). Professor Asimow suggests that policy statements indicate how an agency will pursue its
goals when conducting investigations, prosecutions, legislative rulemaking, and formal or
informal adjudications. Id. at 383.
78. Id. at 386-87.
79. Id. at 383.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1982).
81. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(general policy statements are not law because they do not establish binding norms or make final
determinations of the issues and rights they address).
82. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (nonlegislative rules do not
bind the public).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). Valid legislative rules, of course, are legally enforceable. They
amount to administrative statutes that have the force of federal law. See Pacific Gas, 506 F.2d at
38; Asimow, supra note 77, at 383.
84. Asimow, supra note 77, at 383-84. The Second Circuit has stated that the distinction
between legislative rules and policy statements is "enshrouded in considerable smog." Noel v.
Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1976).
85. Asimow, supra note 77, at 383-84.
86. Id. at 384.
87. Id.
88. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(outlining the several factors).
89. Asimow, supra note 77, at 389-90.
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orders are directed to agency staff, and if aggrieved persons can try to
persuade decisionmakers to withhold the rules in particular cases. 90
Applying these criteria to the NRC's 1986 policy statement at issue
in Alverado, that statement was exactly what it claimed to be. First,
the NRC characterized its action as a policy statement describing the
means it would use to ensure public health and safety. 9' Second, the
statement did not contain mandatory standards for drug testing.
Rather, the NRC's "expectation" was that licensees would institute
"effective" monitoring and testing procedures to ensure employee fitness for duty.92 The word "effective" does not describe a specific
mandatory standard. Third, the policy statement solicited public
comment, 93 and noted that the NRC would refrain from new rulemaking for at least eighteen months. 94 The eighteen-month period reflects
both the temporary and tentative nature of the policy statement; the
NRC's request for public comment indicates this as well. Fourth,
although the NRC's "expectations" were directed to the public," the
entire statement emphasizes that staff will exercise discretion through
regular agency channels.9 6 Essentially, the policy statement was
90. See Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy
Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 550 (1977) (referring generally to Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
91. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,921 (1986). NRC Commissioner Asselstine criticized the agency's
decision to issue a nonenforceable policy statement instead of a rule. Id. at 27,922. The NRC
disagreed with the Commissioner's concern, stating that the AEA granted broad authority to
sanction any licensee that did not operate safely. Id. at 27,923.
92. The essential sections of the policy statement read as follows:
By way of further guidance to licensees, Commission expectations of licensee programs for
fitness for duty of nuclear power plant personnel may be summarized as follows: It is
Commission policy that the sale, use, or possession of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs
within protected areas at nuclear plant sites is unacceptable. It is Commission policy that
persons within protected areas at nuclear power plant sites shall not be under the influence
of any substance, legal or illegal, which adversely affects their ability to perform their duties
in any way related to safety. An acceptable fitness for duty program should at a minimum
include the following essential elements: (1) A provision that the sale, use, or possession of
illegal drugs within the protected area will result in immediate revocation of access to vital
areas and discharge from nuclear power plant activities. The use of alcohol or abuse of legal
drugs within the protected area will result in immediate revocation of access to vital areas
and possible discharge from nuclear power plant activities. (2) A provision that any other
sale, possession, or use of illegal drugs will result in immediate revocation of access to vital
areas, mandatory rehabilitation prior to reinstatement of access, and possible discharge from
nuclear power plant activities. (3) Effective monitoring and testing procedures to provide
reasonable assurance that nuclear power plant personnel with access to vital areas are fit for
duty.
Id. at 27,921.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 27,922.
96. Id. at 27,921-23.
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directed to both staff and the public. The fifth factor-procedures for
aggrieved persons-does not specifically appear in the 1986 statement.
The NRC's request for public comment, however, would certainly
invite input from aggrieved individuals.
The NRC's 1986 policy statement did not constitute federal law.
The statement fit traditional standards delineating policy statements,
and was not preceded by the procedures required for legislative rules.
Because the policy statement did not constitute federal law, it could
not have preempted Washington's constitution under conflict analysis.
The Alverado court's application of traditional occupation of the field
standards, however, had the practical effect of allowing the policy
statement to preempt the state constitution.
B.

The NRCs Policy Statement Gave Licensees Discretion To
Determine "Effective" Testing

The standards in the 1986 policy statement should not have received
the deference accorded by the Alverado court. The court found that
the NRC intended to retain authority over nuclear plant personnel
and supervise the implementation of antidrug programs.9 7 While this
analysis of the NRC's intent may be correct, 98 that intent does not
justify the preemption holding in this case. The plaintiffs did not challenge federal regulations. They did not even challenge the NRC's policy statement. Rather, they claimed that WPPSS' interpretation of the
NRC's nonbinding actions violated state constitutional protections.
The discretion accorded licensees was greater than the Alverado
court claimed. Both the NRC's 1982 proposed rule and 1986 policy
statement describe fitness-for-duty concerns generally.99 The proposed rule would have required "adequate written procedures," 1 '
97. Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash. 2d 424, 428, 759 P.2d 427,
429-430 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
98. "Nothing in this Policy Statement shall limit the authority of the NRC to conduct
inspections as deemed necessary or to take appropriate enforcement action when regulatory
requirements are not met." 51 Fed. Reg. 27,922 (1986).
99. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,980-81 (1982) (proposed rule); 51 Fed. Reg. 27,921-23 (1986)(policy
statement).
100. The essential sections of the proposed rule read as follows:
§ 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
(x)(l) Each licensee . . . shall establish, document, and implement adequate written
procedures designed to ensure that, while on duty, the licensee's and its contractors'
personnel with unescorted access to protected areas are not-(i) Under the influence of
alcohol; (ii) Using any drugs that affect their faculties in any way contrary to safety; or (iii)
Otherwise unfit for duty because of mental or temporary physical impairments that could
affect their performance in any way contrary to safety.
47 Fed. Reg. 33,981 (1982).
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while the policy statement suggested "effective monitoring and testing."11 These vague standards provided only limited guidance for
licensees seeking to implement drug programs. 10 2 Essentially, licensees could decide which procedures and testing would be most "effective" for them. In the policy statement, for example, the NRC
commented favorably on fitness-for-duty guidelines produced by the
Edison Electric Institute ("EEI"). °3 Yet as NRC Commissioner
Asselstine pointed out, the EEI guidelines were optional, not
mandatory, and the utilities could select from among various elements
in formulating their programs.'o 4 The introduction to the EEI guidelines confirms the Commissioner's characterization, for the introduction notes that the EEI's information is not prescriptive' 0 5 and that
06
other methods of ensuring fitness for duty may be equally effective. 1
WPPSS instituted preemployment testing as part of its antidrug
program, yet the NRC did not require preemployment testing. This
conclusion is borne out by the 1982 proposed rule, which would have
specifically required licensees to develop their own programs,'0 7 the
1986 policy statement, the EEI guidelines, and by the fact that not all
nuclear plants adopted preemployment testing.10 8 While the NRC has
recently published a proposed rule requiring preemployment testing,10 9 that fact does not alter licensee discretion under the NRC's
The agency purposely used broad language so that each licensee could develop procedures that
not only considered fairness to and due process for its employees, but also any conditions or
circumstances unique to the licensee's facility. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,980 (1982).
101. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,922 (1986). See supra note 92 (containing full text of the policy
statement).
102. NRC Commissioner Asselstine criticized the policy statement as "too amorphous." In
addition, the Commissioner noted that the statement did not indicate what the Commission
considered an adequate fitness-for-duty program to be. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,922 (1986).
103. Id. at 27,921.
104. Id. at 27,922-23. Commissioner Asselstine further noted that the EEI guidelines were
general in nature and could be interpreted in diverse ways. Id.
105. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, EEl
GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE DRUG AND ALCOHOL/FITNESS FOR DUTY POLICY DEVELOPMENT 1

(rev. 1985).
106. Id.
107. See supra note 100.
108. In the commentary on a proposed rule promulgated September 22, 1988, discussed at
infra note 109, the NRC stated that large industrial companies use preemployment testing more
than any other type, and that "virtually every" nuclear power company employs it as well. 53
Fed. Reg. 36,806 (1988).
109. On September 22, 1988, the NRC published a proposed rule on fitness for duty. 53 Fed.
Reg. 36,795-830 (1988). This new rule requires random urinalysis for all employees. The
random tests, which are the rule's main focus, are supplemented by "testing immediately before
the initial granting of unescorted access to protected areas." Id. at 36,825. Thus, the new
program combines preemployment and random testing. The rule also requires for-cause testing
under particular circumstances. Id.
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previous actions.1 1 In light of the discretion accorded licensees in formulating their antidrug programs, the Alverado court's decision had
the practical effect of conferring preemptive status on WPPSS' discretionary choice.1 11
IV.

NEW FEDERALISM AND AGENCY PREEMPTION

The Washington Supreme Court's focus on traditional occupation
of the field analysis prevented it from reaching the most important
issue in this case: the evolving role of state constitutions in the administrative state. By assessing that role in light of the recent state constitutional revival or "new federalism,"1 " 2 the court could have seen the
need to create an exception to traditional "occupation of the field"
doctrine that preserves state guarantees. Such an exception would
apply state constitutional protections when the specific federal interest
in an occupied field is not expressed by congressional enactments or
agency regulations.
A.

New Federalismas a Check on the Expanding
Administrative State

The decision in Alverado illustrates the Washington Supreme
Court's reluctance to check administrative intrusion on an important
state constitutional guarantee. Because it employed traditional occupation of the field analysis, the court did not evaluate the legal effect
and vagaries of the NRC's pronouncements. The court's approach
allowed both nonbinding agency action and licensee interpretation of
that action to preempt state constitutional guarantees without discussion. The state constitutional revival or "new federalism" justifies a
change in the traditional occupation of the field doctrine. Under gen110. At most, the proposed rule indicates the NRC's current understanding of effective
monitoring and testing procedures. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (discussing
the policy statement's expectations of "effective" procedures).
111. Whether preemployment drug testing is "effective" is beyond the scope of this paper.
Such an inquiry should at least consider two questions: the accuracy of drug testing and the
ability of preemployment testing to identify and deter drug abusers. Many commentators have
assessed the accuracy of drug testing in general. See, e.g., Testing ForDrug Use in the American
Workplace: A Symposium, 11 NOVA L. REV. 291 (1987); Symposium: Drug Testing, 36 U. KAN.
L. REV. 641 (1988). The NRC has acknowledged that the ability of preemployment testing to
detect substance abuse is limited. 53 Fed. Reg. 36,806 (1988). This limitation results from
public notice of the tests. Id. According to the NRC, the only advantage to preemployment
urinalysis is identifying the chemically dependent. Id. In its newly proposed rule, the NRC
deemed this advantage important enough to make preemployment testing a "necessary" part of
adequate fitness-for-duty programs. Id.
112. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing "new federalism" and reliance
on state constitutional law).
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eral preemption doctrine, federal administrative regulations preempt
state legislation. 13 The United States Supreme Court, however, has
never addressed the question whether nonbinding agency action in an
occupied field must preempt state constitutional provisions. The traditional response to this question would be that the preemption doctrine
does not require special deference to a state constitution. Because
state law includes both constitutional provisions and legislation, federal preemption may apply to both with equal force."1 4 In other
words, the fact that the state constitution is the supreme law of a state
should not affect preemption analysis. The Ninth Circuit has already
taken this stance.1 5
While the Ninth Circuit's position likely reflects traditional preemption analysis, it ignores new problems of federal encroachment on sensitive areas of state law posed by an expanding administrative state.
Agencies, the so-called "fourth branch of government,"'1 6 are not
directly subject to the electorate as are the legislative bodies that create
them. Yet federal agency regulations or rules, properly issued, constitute federal law."' These laws can preempt state law just as congressional enactments do." 8 As the administrative state expands, the
probability for agency intrusion on state constitutions will naturally
increase. While such an intrusion would likely have gone unnoticed
thirty years ago," 9 this is not the case today.
113. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985) (agency regulations can preempt state law).
114. The Alverado court implicitly espouses this view since it did not explore the question.
The court stated, without distinguishing constitutional law from statutory law, that "there is
simply no room for the application of state law to matters affecting nuclear safety." Alverado v.
Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash. 2d 424, 430, 759 P.2d 427, 430 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 1637 (1989).
115. See Utility Workers of Am. v. Southern Cal. Edison, 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1530 (1989). In Utility
Workers, a union challenged a nuclear plant's
unilaterally imposed urinalysis program as violating California's constitutional right to privacy.
The court found that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which grants federal
jurisdiction to collective bargaining matters, preempted the state law claim. In making this
conclusion, the court stated that the supremacy clause asserts the power of federal law over state
constitutional provisions as well as over state common and statutory law. Id. at 1087.
116. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (creation of
government agencies, a "fourth branch" of the government, is the most important modem legal
trend and has skewed tripartite theories of government).
117. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. Twentieth-century state courts have only recently begun to rely on their own
constitutions in adjudicating civil rights. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text
(discussing new emphasis on state constitutional law).
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B.

Nonbinding Agency Action Within Occupied Fields Should Not
Preempt State ConstitutionalLaw

Addressing new federalism's future role in preserving civil rights,
Professor Collins predicted that future state courts would assert state
constitutional law in ways never before imagined.120 Alverado
presented just such an opportunity for the Washington court in the
context of agency action and federally-occupied regulatory fields.
The facts in Alverado offer compelling reasons to apply state constitutional protections. First, Alverado concerned an agency's nonbinding pronouncements. There was technically no federal regulation at
all.21 Second, the vagaries of the NRC's pronouncements gave
WPPSS discretion to determine "effective" drug control procedures.' 2 2 Giving preemptive power to licensee discretion does not
bode well for the state constitution, especially as the administrative
state continues to grow and agencies make regular use of policy

statements. 123
Because it prohibits parallel state regulation of any kind,12 1 traditional doctrine concerning occupation of a field allows nonbinding
agency action to preempt state law.125 Thus, when the Alverado court
decided that drug testing fell within the occupied field of nuclear
safety, that decision gave preemptive power to a licensee's interpretation of nonenforceable agency pronouncements. This result illustrates
the need for an exception to traditional occupation of the field doctrine
that asserts the viability of state constitutional guarantees while recognizing the supremacy of federal law.
Courts should uphold state constitutional provisions when a specific
federal interest in an occupied field is expressed by nonbinding agency
action. This exception to occupation of the field analysis recognizes
the increasingly important role of state constitutional law in our federal system, especially in light of the expanding reach of federal agencies and the retrenchment of federal civil rights.
120.

Collins, supra note 60, at 20.

121.

See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text (discussing differences between policy

statements and legislative rules).
122. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text (discussing practical effect of the court's

holding).
123. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing common use of policy
statements).
124. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (occupation of the field doctrine does not

permit parallel state regulation).
125. See supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text (illustrating that the practical effect of
occupation of the field analysis is to allow nonbinding agency action to preempt state law).
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C. Impact of Upholding State ConstitutionalLaw
in Occupied Fields
Courts would serve several ends by upholding state constitutional
rights over nonbinding agency action within federally-occupied fields.
First, state constitutional law would be developed in greater detail,
providing clearer constitutional guidelines for state citizens.12 6 Second, by requiring licensees to accomodate state law when interpreting
agency policy statements or proposed rules, courts can ensure that
state protections are enforced. Third, federal agencies would be notified of state challenges and could incorporate those challenges into
official rulemaking.
The traditional view could argue against this new assertion of state
rights by noting that federal agencies can still promulgate formal rules
with full preemptive power within occupied fields. Hence, the new
state role merely delays the inevitable. This traditional view, however,
ignores the inherent values of rulemaking. The rulemaking process
requires input from the governed, input that can lead to rules that
recognize the peculiarities of individual groups.'2 7 Policy statements
do not require such input. 128 Asserting state rights in occupied fields
simply allows the general public to challenge licensees' reactions to
nonbinding agency action, an opportunity the public might not otherwise receive. Thus, while the traditional view may be correct in asserting that the new state role merely delays an inevitable preemptive
agency rule, that view ignores the fact that the inevitable may become
more palatable when issued through formal procedures.
If the Alverado court had applied article I, section 7 to WPPSS'
preemployment drug screening procedure, that application would not
have impinged upon the NRC's authority in a significant way. At
most, article I, section 7 would have limited WPPSS' choice of effective programs. Additionally, the NRC would have been notified of the
state constitutional requirement and could have considered that
requirement when promulgating a legislative rule.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System, the Washington Supreme Court failed to define the relationship between federal
agency actions and state constitutional law. This failure is particularly
126. Collins, supra note 60, at 7-9.
127. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (describing distinct procedures for formal
rules and policy statements).
128. Id.
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troublesome in light of the expanding reach of federal agencies and the
shrinking scope of federal civil rights. By applying traditional occupation of the field standards, the court allowed nonbinding agency pronouncements to preempt fundamental state privacy guarantees. Such
guarantees should not fall so easily before agency action.
Courts should uphold state constitutional protections when nonbinding agency pronouncements, such as proposed rules and policy
statements, are announced in federally-occupied regulatory fields.
This new assertion of state rights will allow states to develop their
constitutional law while encouraging agencies to make rules, thus
restoring the priority of state law in our federal system.
In the future, perhaps no agency action-whether formal legislative
rule or nonbinding pronouncement-should be allowed to preempt
state constitutional guarantees. Such a rule could employ a balancing
test that weighs the federal interest in uniformity against the state
interest in preserving a particular civil right. As the administrative
state continues to expand, this suggested rule may become reality. A
decision to apply state privacy guarantees in Alverado, however, would
not have required such a radical change in preemption doctrine. By
acknowledging the practical effect of preempting the state constitution
in Alverado, the court could have upheld the civil rights on which the
plaintiffs relied.
Daryl R. Hague

